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Abstract
As Senator Arlen Specter once explained, the Supreme Court confirmation process
is a “matter of great importance” to the president, the nominee, senators, and the
public at large. The public cares who sits on the Court, and interest groups play a
key role in disseminating information about the nominee and his or her qualifications
for the job. In this paper, we focus on one piece of interest groups’ involvement in
Supreme Court confirmation hearings: their decision to send senators summarized
information about the nominees via briefing books. We use a combination of archival
research and text analysis to examine the briefing books that organized interests sent
to Senator Specter during Robert Bork’s nomination, which we then compare with
the information provided by “official” sources (the White House) as well as the less
formal ones (constituents). Our research suggests that interest groups highlight the
controversial areas of a nominee’s tenure, while official sources highlight qualifications
and constituents speak about the nominee in more general, affective terms.
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When Justice Lewis Powell announced his retirement from the Supreme Court on
June 26, 1987, President Ronald Reagan took less than a week to announce that he was
nominating D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork to replace him (Toobin 2008). Reagan and his
counselors were confident they had a slam-dunk choice with their conservative pick; Bork had
a sterling academic record that made him eminently qualified for the position, and the Senate
had unanimously confirmed his ideological ally, Antonin Scalia, to the Court the year before
(Toobin 2008). Unfortunately for Bork, however, the Democrats who now controlled the
Senate firmly disagreed with Reagan’s assessment. Less than forty-five minutes after Bork
became the nominee, Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy took the Senate floor to lambaste
the decision, describing “Robert Bork’s America” as
“a land in which women would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would
sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens’ doors
in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution, writers
and artists could be censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the
federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for whom the
judiciary is – and is often the only – protector of the individual rights that are
at the heart of our democracy” (Kennedy 2009, 406).
Where Reagan saw conservative bona fides, Kennedy saw a judicial philosophy that would be
catastrophic to everyone he aimed to represent (Kennedy 2009). Kennedy began engaging
with people who could raise awareness of the nomination beyond his speech, asking legal
scholars and advocates for African Americans and women to put pressure on other senators to
deny confirmation (Kennedy 2009). By the time Bork appeared before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in mid-September, more than 80 groups mobilized to oppose Bork’s nomination,
while the White House and almost 30 other groups rallied in support of him (Cameron et al.
2018). The intense focus on the nomination’s outcome made the confirmation hearings both
high profile and contentious, with senators probing Bork’s thoughts on everything from his
beard to a woman’s right to choose. By late October, a majority of senators believed that
1

Bork was not right for the Supreme Court, and the Senate voted 58-42 to deny Bork a seat
on the nation’s highest court (Toobin 2008).
Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court is a watershed moment in Supreme
Court history, at least in part because it brought about a seismic shift in interest groups’ participation in the process. Outside interests began consistently getting involved in Supreme
Court nominations starting with Clement Haynsworth’s nomination in 1969, with an average
of 10 interest groups participating in each of the nine nominations that occurred between him
and Scalia in 1986 (Cameron et al. 2018). Fast forward to the post-Bork era, and this number rises to an average of 30 groups per nomination (Cameron et al. 2018). Why? Because
Bork’s eventual defeat showed outside interests they could wield enough power to influence
senators’ votes on Supreme Court nominees (Steigerwalt 2010). True, presidents select their
nominees with an eye toward success (Nemacheck 2008), and presidents control the initial
conversation about the nominee (Johnson and Roberts 2004), but interest groups can influence the public reception of that message. They can mobilize their constituents around
or against a nominee and pressure senators to listen to their thoughts (Caldeira, Hojnacki
and Wright 2000). They can also conduct valuable research on nominees’ backgrounds and
provide their analyses to senators (as well as their constituents) for review and reflection,
supplementing the information they already have (Caldeira and Wright 1998; Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright 2000; Steigerwalt 2010). Senators who dismiss interest groups’ concerns
risk electoral failure, because those groups can also utilize their resources to attack those
senators seeking to retain their offices (Epstein and Segal 2005). After Bork, interest groups
knew they could influence senators’ approaches to Supreme Court nominees, and they turned
that influence into power over the process.
In this paper, we seek to better understand the information that interest groups
provide senators when they organize and lobby for or against a Supreme Court nominee.
Research clearly establishes that interest groups’ presence in the confirmation process can
directly or indirectly influence senators’ behavior (by, for example, lobbying the senator or
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seeking to influence the constituents to whom senators are attuned, respectively) (Caldeira
and Wright 1998; Epstein and Segal 2005; Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010; Steigerwalt
2010). Interest groups use a variety of tactics to do this (Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright
2000). We focus on one tactic – information provision via briefing books and letters – to
answer one question – what are interest groups and constituents saying to senators? More
specifically, what information are interest groups providing that makes them so influential?
And how does it differ from the “official” information provided by the nominee and the
White House? We look to the Senate Judiciary Committee for answers, as senators task
that committee with collecting information about a nominee and disseminating it to the rest
of the Senate for consideration before the final vote (Collins and Ringhand 2013). Using
content analyses of briefing books and constituent letters sent to Senator Arlen Specter
during the Bork hearings, we find that interest groups help senators condense a nominee’s
lifetime of decisions, publications, course lectures, and speeches down to small categories
with headlined topics, and they highlight information that even the officials tasked with
vetting the nominee might not expect to see covered.
By conducting this analysis, we provide two key contributions to the study of Supreme
Court nominations and confirmations. First, we analyze the information that interest groups
provide senators, something other analyses in this field have not yet accomplished. Interest
groups use a variety of tactics when lobbying senators about executive branch nominees,
but many of those tactics involve information provision, either to constituents or to the
senator directly (Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright 2000). Members of the Judiciary Committee
specifically and senators more generally need information from interest groups to bolster the
data they already have about a nominee (Steigerwalt 2010). With that said, nobody has
studied the content of the provided information to see what makes it useful. We use the
White House and interest group briefing books as well as constituent letters to a senator
to examine their messages. Because we have data from three different sources, we are also
able to compare how interest groups’ concerns match the concerns outlined in constituent
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letters as well as the government’s own thoughts regarding the nominee. We are providing
an initial examination into the informational value of these important documents.
Secondly, we are the first researchers to use a senator’s personal papers to systematically and empirically analyze interest group behavior. Here, we follow in the steps of
scholars like Howard and Roberts (2015), who also use personal papers to study a broader
process. Scholars who study Supreme Court confirmations have used raw counts of interest
group activities (Epstein and Segal 2005; Farganis and Wedeking 2014), interviews (Caldeira
and Wright 1998; Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright 2000; Steigerwalt 2010), and newspapers
(Cameron et al. 2018; Cameron, Kastellec and Park 2013) to examine interest groups’ involvement in the process, suggesting that scholars get creative when studying influence. By
using Specter’s papers, we offer a new approach to examining interest groups and their
attempts to influence Supreme Court confirmations.

Supreme Court Confirmations and Interest Groups
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution tasks members of the Senate
with advising the president on Supreme Court nominations and consenting to their appointments, a duty that senators treat as uniquely important. This treatment stems from
senators’ motivations; senators, like any other congressional representative, are reelectionoriented (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013), which means they focus their attention
on anything their constituents find interesting. Supreme Court nominations draw attention
from the media as well as interest groups (Collins and Ringhand 2013; Cameron, Kastellec
and Park 2013), which greatly increases the likelihood that a senator’s constituents will hear
and care about their senator’s response to a High Court nominee (Kastellec, Lax and Phillips
2010). Consequently, senators care about this particular nomination and confirmation process more than they care about many other executive appointments. Senators historically
treat inaction or disruption in the process as politically untenable (Chiou and Rothenberg
2014) and avoid utilizing the dilatory tactics that plague less visible nominations, like holds
4

(Howard and Roberts 2015), blue slips (Black, Madonna and Owens 2014), and filibusters
(Binder and Maltzman 2009). The Senate Judiciary Committee traditionally schedules hearings for the nominee regardless of the surrounding political climate (Farganis and Wedeking
2014), and the committee always releases the nominee to the floor for a vote.1 Importantly,
these hearings typically end with a new justice sitting on the Court, as the president purposefully selects his nominee with an eye toward confirmation and the Senate offers some
level of deference to him on these appointments (Krutz, Fleisher and Bond 1998; Nemacheck
2008; Moraski and Shipan 1999).
While senatorial norms should essentially guarantee a nominee a successful floor
vote, the nomination and confirmation process is contentious enough to always put a nominee’s confirmation in question. Presidents purposefully select ideologically extreme nominees
(Cameron, Kastellec and Park 2013); senators are hostile in their questioning of nominees
(Farganis and Wedeking 2014); a senator’s ideological similarity to the nominee is crucial
for a positive vote even if the nominee is eminently qualified (Epstein et al. 2006); partisanship has turned nominations into battlegrounds for scoring political points (Lee 2009; Smith
2007); and interest groups are more involved in the confirmation process than they were even
forty years ago (Cameron, Kastellec and Park 2013). In short, senators put Supreme Court
nominees through a combative process, with defeat being a real possibility the entire time.
The force behind this combative process is the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
standing committee responsible for investigating Article III judicial nominees. The members’ collective goal is to serve their colleagues by collecting and dispersing information about
the nominee to aid in knowledgeable confirmation decisions (Collins and Ringhand 2016;
Hamilton 2003). Committee members take this role seriously, understanding that confirmed
nominees will influence policies made and interpreted by the judicial branch (Steigerwalt
2010). Their information comes from four different formal sources: (1) the nominee ques1

Republicans’ refusal to schedule hearings for Merrick Garland in 2016 and Democrats’ later decision to
use the filibuster against Neil Gorsuch’s 2017 nomination remain aberrations to senatorial norms (Berenson
2017; Flegenheimer 2017).
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tionnaire, which contains information about a nominee’s background, education, financial
interests, work experiences, and past decisions; (2) the FBI background check conducted
at the request of the White House; (3) the American Bar Association’s investigation of the
nominee; and (4) the nominee’s hearing before the committee (Steigerwalt 2010). Senators
also collect information during so-called “courtesy calls,” or pre-hearing visits by the nominee
to senators’ chambers for one-on-one conversations with whichever senator wants to speak
with the nominee (McMillion 2018). The confirmation hearing draws the most attention, as
it is the televised portion of the investigation (Farganis and Wedeking 2014). Senators on
the committee use the hearing to question nominees about their thoughts on civil liberties,
judicial decision-making, legal philosophy, and past Court rulings (Farganis and Wedeking
2011; Solberg and Waltenburg 2015). This is also where senators grandstand, asking the
nominee questions that constituents and the party faithful asked and answered (Schoenherr,
Lane and Armaly 2018). Supreme Court confirmation hearings provide Judiciary Committee
members with the opportunity to complete an important task while also scoring political
points, suggesting that senators have every incentive to do this part of their job well.
Before Judiciary Committee members get to the confirmation hearing, however, they
have to review the nominee’s background and approach to the law. After all, it is difficult
to score political points without knowing where they can be scored. The nominee questionnaire (complete with the text of the nominee’s ten most important decisions), the FBI
report, and the ABA investigation provide senators with a starting point for their research,
and each party also has its own investigatory committee that scrutinizes the nominee as
well (Epstein and Segal 2005; Steigerwalt 2010). The White House also typically provides
summarized information about the nominee (Davis 2017), which ostensibly helps the senators make it through the information (though presidents undoubtedly use these summaries
to highlight the good part of a nominee’s record, not the bad). Senators on the Judiciary
Committee and their staffs are expected to sort through this mountain of information and
use the confirmation hearing to clarify anything not covered in the provided documents.
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Judiciary Committee members then summarize their findings and provide them to the rest
of the Senate. Importantly, senators complete this task while fulfilling their more general
responsibilities, including investigating around 46 lower court judges every year2 and reviewing legislation that falls under the committee’s jurisdiction (Epstein and Segal 2005).
Given that time is finite, senators struggle to read, condense, and analyze in an appropriate
amount of time (Steigerwalt 2010). Interest groups, however, have the resources to focus on
one nominee’s background and the time to analyze her background closely.
When it comes to the Senate Judiciary Committee, interest groups exchange a service
– analyzing nominee’s backgrounds and providing committee members with the highlights
– for influence. Outside interests are able to exert influence by controlling how much of
their analyses get passed on to senators. This information can include, but is not limited to,
written analyses of a nominee’s voting record, highlights of relevant speeches and decisions
(Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright 2000; Steigerwalt 2010), projections on how a nominee will
vote once he or she is confirmed, and data on how constituents feel about the nominee
(Caldeira and Wright 1998). Groups that support the nominee will direct the senators
toward details that make the nominee look good, like a nominee’s “restraint” or the number
of times the Supreme Court upheld the nominee’s lower court decisions, while groups that
oppose the nomination will direct senators toward problems in the nominee’s record. Interest
groups provide senators with information, but that information is purposefully biased in a
way that benefits the group that curated it.
After an interest group locates the information that supports its preferred outcome,
the group must choose how to disseminate it. It can engage in grassroots lobbying and
encourage people to contact public officials regarding a nomination (Caldeira, Hojnacki and
Wright 2000; Cohen 1998). This public lobbying, which utilizes everything from protests to
mass mailers to robocalls, encourages citizens to contact their senators and pressure them to
follow groups’ recommendations. Less visibly, interest groups can also use their resources to
2

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/apptsbypres.pdf
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provide senators with information via briefing books and other written documents. Regardless of how an interest group chooses to appeal to a senator, publicly or privately, a senator
who chooses to ignore their material does so at his potential electoral peril; the same groups
that mobilize to support or oppose Supreme Court nominations can also mobilize in support
of or opposition to senators based on their voting behavior (Epstein and Segal 2005; Scherer
2005).
Interest groups’ exchange of information for influence in the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation process have proven to be wildly successful transactions. The minute
an opening appears, groups mobilize in preparation of supporting or rejecting the president’s
nominee (Cameron et al. 2018). Presidents consult different interest groups about nominees
and seek their approval before they announce their selections (Nemacheck 2008). The information that interest groups provide regarding a nominee’s record and constituents’ feelings
about her can influence how a senator votes on a nominee (Gibson and Caldeira 2009), and
nominees who find themselves fighting a lopsidedly-large number of opposition groups are
less likely to secure confirmation (Cameron, Kastellec and Park 2013). Interest groups influence the confirmation process, and information provision is one of their paths to obtaining
that influence.

Examining Interest Groups’ Information
Information provision is a tactical process. Presidents provide independent explanations of their nominees’ records when they feel it will be useful to do so, and they consequently provide this information in varying formats (Davis 2017). Steigerwalt (2010), who
interviewed a former senator and several Senate staffers about judicial nominations, found
that interest groups are strategic in whom they target with research. Liberal-learning interest groups only contact ideologically sympathetic senators or moderate senators who might
“flip” and vote with the Democrats. They did not waste their resources appealing to conservative senators, as they were unlikely to use the information provided. Conservative groups,
8

on the other hand, typically provided senators with very little information about a nominee, something that conservative senators found endlessly frustrating as they too would like
interest group help in sorting through information (Steigerwalt 2010).3
To examine the information provided by interest groups, then, we find ourselves focusing on the documents that organized interests provided to one senator in particular: Senator
Arlen Specter. Specter was a notoriously independent Republican (and, later, Democrat) on
the Senate Judiciary Committee who voted on the winning side of every one of the thirteen
nominations he saw between 1981 and 2010 (Lockman and Schertzer 2017). Both parties
were convinced that his vote was crucial for validating or invalidating a nominee’s credentials
(Specter and Robbins 2002), which made him an obvious target for “flipping” and therefore
a target to receive information from interest groups. Additionally, Specter was a mainstay
on the Judiciary Committee starting in 1981, suggesting he knew how to handle the job
in the televised age. This is particularly important given that C-SPAN’s decision to begin
airing the hearings in 1981 inherently changed senators’ approach to the process (Farganis
and Wedeking 2014). Finally, Specter’s personal papers are available to researchers through
the Arlen Specter Center for Public Service (Specter 2018), providing scholars with a peek
into the interest group process they would not otherwise have, given that no other senators
who served concurrently with Specter have released their papers.4
In order to systematically examine the types of information interest groups provided
Senator Specter, we went to the archives at the University of Pittsburgh and began by
3

Importantly, anecdotal evidence suggests conservative interest groups got more involved in Supreme
Court confirmation hearings around then-Judge John G. Roberts’s hearings in 2005 (Taylor 2009) and played
an especially prominent role during now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination in 2018 (Nelson 2018). Given
our decision to focus on the Bork hearings, however, probing this change is beyond the scope of this paper.
We discuss this more in the conclusion.
4

Three other senators’ papers would also be ideal for this project – those from Joe Biden, Orrin Hatch,
and Ted Kennedy. All three sat on the Judiciary Committee around the same time as Specter and were
some of its most senior members. Democrats Biden and Kennedy would have received information from
liberal-leaning interest groups seeking to influence a nomination, and Hatch, who showed a willingness to
vote for Democratically-nominated judges like Ruth Bader Ginsburg, would have also been a target. Yet
none of their papers are publicly available at this time. Biden and Hatch are both still alive and have not
yet announced plans for releasing their Senate papers, and Kennedy’s library is still cataloging the papers
from his almost fifty years of Senate service.
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photographing nearly every document contained in the archives relating to Supreme Court
nominations.5 We focused our activities on typed material (more on that momentarily) and
did not include anything handwritten, including Specter’s notes on the nominee’s materials,
handwritten speech drafts, handwritten letters, and notes passed between the Senator and
his staff or other senators. We also excluded photographs. Throughout our data collection,
we noticed Senator’s Specter’s abundant collection of political cartoons surrounding Supreme
Court confirmations. Unfortunately, these witty illustrations and handwritten materials are
unable to be processed by our software. All in all, our collection efforts produced almost
seven thousand photographs spanning 877 documents. Upon full review of the documents
we collected, we unfortunately discovered that many of the nominee’s files were incomplete.
One file that was not, however, was Robert Bork’s. 57% of the pictures that we took came
from Specter’s files on Robert Bork, and the Senator’s staff clearly took pains to keep as
much information as was possible for the hearing that made Specter famous. Consequently,
we focus our analysis in this paper on Judge Bork’s nomination, Senator Specter’s most
complete files.
Because most of the documents we photographed spanned multiple pages and therefore multiple photographs, we grouped the photographs of the same documents together,
then divided those documents into one of seven categories: (1) briefing books; (2) cases; (3)
letters; (4) news media (e.g., newspaper clippings, magazines, etc.); (5) nominee background
(e.g., law review articles written by the nominee, copies of the nominee’s speeches, and other
written work); (6) Specter’s notes; and (7) office communication. With the documents gathered and organized, we then sought to turn these photographs into computer-readable text
files. Photographs alone would only enable us to read the documents outside of the library,
but we wanted to do more systematic research using the text itself, so we took pictures and
essentially turned them into Word documents. To do this, we relied on a popular optical
5

Specifically, our data came from Specter’s Legislative Files (Group 2 in the collection), where we focused
on the Nominations, 1965-2010 collection, which is located in the Committee on the Judiciary, 1965-2010
files (Series 1, Subseries 3), see Specter 2018.
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character recognition (OCR) software, ABBYY Finereader. OCR software reads typed text
from the photographs we took and translates it into a raw text file, which we can then use
to perform a wide variety of content analyses.
To see exactly how ABBYY works, see Figure 1. This is a photograph of a colorful
letter sent to Specter by the National Conservative Political Action Committee just two days
after Bork’s failed confirmation. Figure 2 is a screenshot of the raw text file produced by
ABBYY Finereader after running the photograph in Figure 1 through the optical recognition
software. With this text file we can search for words, count their frequency, and utilize more
complicated text analysis techniques to better understand the information contained within
the documents that Specter received.

11
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Figure 1: Photograph of a letter sent to Senator Specter
by the National Conservative Political Action Committee (Specter 2018).

Figure 2: Screenshot of the text file generated by ABBYY Finereader from the photo shown in Figure 1. All
of the typed text is translated into the text file, but
the handwritten text like Chairman Shortley’s signature
and the initials at the top of the letter are unreadable
and therefore not carried over to the text file.

Methodology
After gathering the information and converting it to text, we decided to use an unsupervised topic modeling approach to systematically and empirically analyze the content
of three types of documents contained in the Bork files: (1) briefing books compiled by the
Reagan administration and sent to each senator; (2) briefing books compiled by interest
groups and sent to Senator Specter; and (3) letters about the Bork nomination that Specter
received and kept in his files. Our decision to focus on these three pieces of information is
purposeful, as we want to study the information provided to Specter on a broad level while
simultaneously comparing the interest groups’ information to that provided by other sources,
particularly the “official” information provided by the White House as well as the more grassroots engagement by constituents via letters. We have two government briefing books; the
Reagan administration prepared a seventy-five page book about Bork’s background and distributed it to all senators in advance of his confirmation hearing (Davis 2017). Following the
deluge of criticism on Bork’s nomination, the administration also issued a separate and more
comprehensive briefing book as a response to Bork’s critics (Davis 2017). When looking at
interest group briefing books, we went through the books from 23 different groups, nearly
all of them liberal-leaning ones like the American Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund. Finally, we examined the texts of 72 constituent letters sent to Specter.
These letters came from friends, former representatives, professors at the major law schools
in Pennsylvania, and national groups, all involving short notes and personalized pleas to
Specter regarding the nominee.
If our goal is to identify the topics covered in organized interest groups’ briefing
books so that we can compare them to the information provided by constituent letters
and the White House itself, then we need to find a way to systematically work through the
information contained in the documents. Historically, people collected data like this by hand,
reading through each book and keeping track of each topic that was discussed between its
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covers (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Such collection would result in a list of all the concepts
discussed in each book and across all the books, along with a measure of the frequency with
which each topic got mentioned.
There are two problems with this human-assisted approach, however. The first is
that coding requires pre-established categories, which means that coding requires ex ante
assumptions about the text under study that may or may not be in the data itself (Rice
2019). A coder’s job is to break text down into categories, and they do so by applying
a set of pre-established rules to the document in front of them. A coder reading through
the Legal Defense Fund’s discussion of poll taxes, for example, needs to know if he should
categorize that section under “voting rights” or under “privacy.” To do this, coders make
assumptions about the documents in front of them, including how broad they want to make
the categories – do they want voting rights to be its own topic, or do they want voting rights
to fall under the more generic civil rights? – and where to draw the line between categories –
can polling taxes also be considered “discrimination”? True, coders can go back and modify
their categories after coding, but there is still always room for human error when it comes
to categorization (Rice 2019).
The second problem is that humans are imperfect coders regardless of the coding
scheme. On a good day, when there are clear rules and a person is fully committed to
coding, human-assisted coding is the gold standard for collecting data from text (Grimmer
and Stewart 2013). But, realistically, coders are human. They get hungry, tired, and thirsty,
all of which distracts them from coding at optimal levels (Schoenherr and Black 2019). They
need time to code, and they need payment to do it. Worse, thirty years of post-Bork analysis
have also left preconceived notions about the topics covered during the hearing in its wake,
which could bias the coders before they even begin coding. Humans are not ideal for coding
this kind of data, so we decided to utilize machine learning processes to do the work for us
instead.
Unsupervised topic modeling alleviates the problems we just outlined. Topic modeling
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uses word frequencies to identify latent concepts, or the topics contained in texts (Rice 2019).
Rather than telling the computer which topics to look for, topic modeling tells researchers
which words tend to be grouped together, letting researchers see the topics that were covered.
The researcher then labels these groups of words as belonging to certain topics. Ultimately,
the researcher decides how broad or narrow to make the topics by specifying how many
concepts the model should identify, but the model does the rest of the work. Given the
thousands of pages of text to examine, the fallibility of human coders, and our desire to
avoid bringing preconceived notions of topics into the analysis, supervised topic modeling
was the best option for this project.
Before analyzing the text, we preprocessed it. We removed punctuation, numbers,
unnecessary white space, and “stopwords” like “the” or “and” from the text. Additionally,
we broke all words down into their stems, so that words like “judge,” “judges,” and “judging,”
all get treated as the same word during our analysis. Removing punctuation and stopwords
and stemming the remaining words reduces the number of parameters under examination
(Manning and Schutze 1999). This consequently makes it easier to draw inferences about
the words used in a document. We cleaned our data and conducted our analyses using
quanteda, an R package for text management and analysis developed by Kenneth Benoit
and his colleagues (Benoit et al. 2017).

Analysis
Because our project is exploratory, our focus is more on content than it is on why
the information is there in the first place. We thus start our analysis by looking at the
information contained in the White House briefing books, which allows us to set a baseline
of information – the information provided by the “official” keepers of Bork’s nomination,
the people most invested in ensuring his confirmation. From there, we can see how interest
groups diverged from the official line or maintained the status quo of information. Finally,
we conclude with a look at constituent letters sent to Senator Specter throughout the course
15

of the hearing, with an eye toward identifying the information conveyed in these shorter
documents.
We start our analysis of each of the three document types by looking at word clouds
of the documents. Word clouds visually show the frequency with which certain words occur
across a set of texts, helping researchers identify key words in documents. Figure 3 displays
the word cloud of the top 100 words that appear in the White House briefing books. The
words that are larger and toward the center of the cloud are the words that appear most
frequently in the documents; as you move away from the center and toward the perimeter
of the circle, the words that appear less frequently (though still frequently enough to be
one of the top 100 words) are in green. Unsurprisingly, the most frequently-used words
in the White House briefing books are “bork” and “judge.” Moving away from the center
of Figure 3, however, shows the government briefing books focused on Bork’s record, with
words like “religion,” “anti-trust,”, “privacy,” and “discrimination” appearing frequently in
the documents. This word cloud lacks sentimental words like “feel” or “support,” focusing
instead on issue areas, which suggests the White House focused on Bork’s qualifications for
the job and not peoples’ affective feelings toward his rulings.
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Figure 3: Word cloud of the 100 most frequently-used words in the White House briefing
books on Judge Robert Bork. The larger words in the center of the cloud are the most used;
the government used the words toward the perimeter of the circle with less frequency.

The results of the topic model better illuminate the content of the White House
briefing books. We instructed the model to break the text down into fifteen topics based
on trial and error – the models with ten categories collapsed too much information into a
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single category, while the model with 20 categories provided repeated categories, including
two nearly-identical Establishment Clause categories. Figure 4 shows some of the words
that appear in each topic along with our interpretation of the topics those words represent.
Of our fifteen categories, we threw out one because it contained mainly initials (”H,” for
example, which stood for Bork’s middle name, Heron, or ”v,” as in the letter that separates
the petitioner from the respondent in a case name). The remaining fourteen categories
confirm our suspicions from Figure 3 that the White House focused on Judge Bork’s past
rulings and qualifications for the job.

Figure 4: Table of topics included in the White House briefing books on Judge Robert Bork.

As Figure 4 shows, the White House focused at least part of its attention on the
man Bork was replacing, Lewis F. Powell. Presidents pay attention to nominees who might
change the balance of the Court (Krehbiel 2007; Moraski and Shipan 1999), and Reagan
nominated Bork to replace Powell and his moderate swing vote (Toobin 2008). The White
House understandably walked through Bork’s suitability as a replacement for the senators,
then. Beyond that logistical question, however, the White House almost exclusively wrote
about Bork’s academic and judicial work on different issue areas. They talked about his
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specialty area, anti-trust law, as well as his views on privacy and free speech, two areas in
which Democrats raised concerns about Bork’s views. Importantly, the White House also
spent time walking through his association with Watergate – after all, then-Solicitor General
Bork was the one who fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox after the Attorney General
and his deputy resigned rather than do it themselves (Nobel 1987). In all, the government
supplied senators with information about Bork’s engagement with thirteen different areas of
law, all presented as factual and all undoubtedly analyzed with an eye toward confirmation.
Interestingly, one issue area the Reagan White House did not discuss was abortion.
Kennedy’s opening salvo established that Bork’s rulings on abortion threatened the viability
of Roe v. Wade, but the White House brushed past it. Its vague focus on privacy did
not lead into a specific discussion of reproductive rights. Interest groups did talk about
abortion, however. As Figure 5 shows, “abortion” was among the top 300 words used by
interest groups in their briefing books, appearing 634 times. The government may have
focused on Bork’s qualifications, but the interest groups emphasized their problems with his
rulings. Other words that appeared frequently included “women,” “rights,” and “justice.”
Based on the word cloud for these 23 briefing books, the interest groups provided different
information than their White House counterparts did.
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Figure 5: Word cloud of the 300 most frequently-used words in the 23 interest group briefing
books on Judge Robert Bork. The larger words in the center of the cloud are the most used;
the government used the words toward the perimeter of the circle with less frequency.

When looking at the topics covered in the interest group briefing books, the differences
between the White House’s discussion of Bork and interest groups’ own analyses appear
clearly. We again broke the briefing books down into fifteen topics and we again threw out
one category for being a hodge-podge of random letters and words. As Table 6 shows, interest
groups also focused on multiple areas of the law, though they wanted to draw senators’
attention to civil rights, voting rights, and abortion, three areas the government avoided in
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its briefing books. Organized interests’ discussion of privacy focused on reproductive rights,
and they explicitly discussed abortion and the Court’s ruling in Roe. The interest groups hit
exactly the topics that Kennedy outlined in his speech, even if the government did not. Like
their government counterparts, they did not use affective language to do it, either; they, too,
focused on just the facts.

Figure 6: Table of topics included in the 23 briefing books regarding the Bork nomination
that interest groups sent to Senator Arlen Specter.
Additionally, interest groups engaged in comparisons, something the White House
did not do. Obviously, interest groups mentioned the now-departed Justice Powell, but
they also brought up the other justices. They mentioned Justice Byron White (who wrote
the dissenting opinion in Roe), Justice Hugo Black (a civil rights advocate), and Justice
John Marshall Harlan II (an ardent advocate of adhering to precedent) (Woodward and
Armstrong 1979). In doing so, the interest groups compared Bork’s record to those of sitting
and departed justices, offering a comparison of approaches.
While the White House and interest groups had clear agendas with their briefing
books, the letters that Senator Specter received were more varied and less straightforward
in their language. Figure 7 shows the word cloud of the 300 most-used words across the
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72 constituent letters that Specter received. Compared to the clouds for the White House
briefing books and the interest group briefing books, one thing is clear: fewer words stick
out as obvious talking points. The words that are larger and toward the center of the cloud,
like “supreme,” “senate,” and “constitution,” are generic terms one would expect to see
in a letter about a Supreme Court nomination, and words like “abortion” and “anti-trust”
appear on the perimeters, suggesting these letter writers focused on many different issues.
This is to be expected from small groups and individuals crafting letters to members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The White House had a unified strategy and composed
two informational documents for the Senate. Similarly, interest groups had to craft equallystrong documents to either enhance or combat the White House’s talking points. These
groups have bright political strategists who have the ability to compose a cohesive message.
Conversely, individuals write letters about topics that are significant to them with regard
to the nomination. A law school professor or practicing attorney likely differs greatly from
your average Joe Constituent from Pennsylvania, and the letters show that.
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Figure 7: Word cloud of the 300 most frequently-used words in the 72 letters sent to Senator
Arlen Specter regarding Judge Robert Bork. The larger words in the center of the cloud are
the most used; the government used the words toward the perimeter of the circle with less
frequency.

The topics provided by the topic model suggest letter writers focused on varied content
as well, as Figure 8 shows. Again, we instructed the model to locate fifteen topics, though
this time we left five of them out of the analysis because they were filled with jargon.6 Some
6

ABBYY Fine Reader had a difficult time turning the letters into analyzable text. The briefing books
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of the same topics appear in the letters that appeared in the briefing books, like Bork’s role
in Watergate (something the interest groups ignored, to an extent). But, more importantly,
these letters contain emotional elements. Constituents talk about the Democratic response
to Bork; they offer criticism, and they offer support. They talk less about the facts, which the
White House and interest groups discussed with such care, and focus more on the impressions
left on them by the entire affair. The constituent letters provide different information than
their formal counterparts, given less explanation about Bork as a judge and more gut-feeling
responses to the nominee himself.

Figure 8: Table of topics included in the 72 letters regarding the Bork nomination that
people sent to Senator Arlen Specter.

Conclusion and Future Research
Writing in his memoirs in the early 2000s, Senator Arlen Specter recalled the impact
that Senator Kennedy’s speech had on the Bork hearings, noting,
from the White House and interest groups were well-constructed, with groups producing beautifully-typed
books that Senator Specter and his team did not mark up. For the most part, turning the original documents
into readable text was unproblematic for these types of documents. Constituent letters were a different story,
however. The letters had typos, ink smudges, and uneven spacing, making some of them difficult to read
and process. Moreover, Specter and his staff clearly read these letters, as they contained hand-written notes
and even, in a few instances, what looked like part of Specter’s lunch mushed into the page. Clearly, no
one expected researchers to come through thirty years later and try to digitize the text on these letters.
Consequently, we ended up with more noise – random letters appearing, other letters disappearing, words
that did not match each other – in this part of the analysis than we had in the other parts.
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“Kennedy crusaded against Bork. He rallied African-American ministers and
leaders in the South. Hundreds of liberal organizations enlisted in the anti-Bork
cause. Bork’s opponents launched a massive public relations campaign...The
idea was to poison public opinion against Bork, to influence and pressure senators...The battle over Bork was so high-profile that it became almost compulsory
for interest groups to join” (Specter and Robbins 2002, 321-322).
In Specter’s view, Kennedy’s speech and subsequent engagement with interest groups encouraged those groups to use all of their resources to defeat Bork’s nomination. The Judiciary Committee found itself inundated with information from these groups, though Specter
claimed that he remained above the raucous fray (Specter and Robbins 2002). Organized
interests wanted to influence the senators and alter their behavior, and they were mobilized
and energized in their fight.
During the Bork hearings, interest groups did everything from buying television adds
to sending mass mailings to directly lobbying senators to vote a certain way (Totenberg
2012). People for the American Way sent journalists and senators daily alerts about Bork’s
nomination and almost forty percent of the nation’s full-time law faculty at accredited schools
sent the Judiciary Committee letters saying Bork was unfit for a place on the Supreme Court
(Specter and Robbins 2002). Less dramatically, interest groups also sent briefing books to
the senators, providing them with summaries of the wealth of information that was available
regarding Bork’s judicial philosophy and approach to certain types of cases. Judge Robert
Bork had more material to sort through than any nominee before him; senators and the
public had to sort through a public record of 80 speeches, 30 law review articles, and 145
circuit court opinions if they wanted to comprehensively review Bork’s record (Specter and
Robbins 2002). Anyone providing senators with information had to pick certain battles to
fight – to highlight one section of Bork’s record over another – leading to briefing books that
were anything but unbiased in their examination of Bork’s career.
Using Senator Arlen Specter’s personal papers, we examined the information provided
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by the people seeking to influence Specter’s vote on the Bork nomination. Specifically,
we looked at the briefing books provided by the White House and liberal interest groups,
as well as a collection of letters sent directly to Specter from constituents and interest
groups alike. We utilized optical character recognition software to turn Specter’s papers into
computerized text, and then we employed text analysis tools, including word frequencies and
topic modeling, to empirically examine the content of the papers. Our goal was to identify
what, exactly, was in those books and letters, and how the content differed across senders. We
found that organized groups – the White House and interest groups – sent factual information
while letter writers sent emotional appeals. The White House, first attempting to underscore
Bork’s credentials and later attempting to rebut criticism of the judge, summarized that
record in two briefing books they sent to senators (Davis 2017). Interest groups, mostly
seeking to highlight the aspects of Bork’s record they deemed problematic, did the same,
though, as our research shows, they covered different areas than the White House briefs.
The letter writers, however, focused less on the substance of Bork’s record and more on their
feelings about the nominee...based, at least in part, on the information the government and
interest groups were pumping into the public sphere.
While our paper is the first to use the information provided to senators to study
informational appeals, our decision to use archival data also has limitations. First and most
importantly, the data we used for this project restricts its extension to other confirmation
hearings. Our analysis focuses on one hearing, and, as we discuss throughout this paper, the
Bork hearing was unique. Yet we exclusively focus on the Bork nomination because it had
the most comprehensive set of nomination files in the Specter collection. Ideally, we would
utilize a secondary data source, like the Senate Judiciary Committee’s files at the National
Archives, to supplement the Specter papers and paint a more complete picture of nominations
in the modern era, but the National Archives embargoes files for about thirty years before
releasing them to the public. Consequently, our results are bound to the nomination under
study. In future work, we would like to supplement the Specter files with information from
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other sources as it becomes available.
Secondly, we see almost no information from conservative interest groups, leaving us
to wonder how the right characterized the nomination and the nominee. The 23 groups
that sent briefing books to Specter were liberal-learning groups like the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL). While
conservative groups like the National Conservative Political Action Committee did send
Specter a letter, they did not provide a briefing book with summarized information about
Bork’s record. Steigerwalt (2010) found that conservative groups were particularly lax in
sending briefing books or background summaries to senators through the early 2000s, but
anecdotal evidence suggests conservative groups got more involved starting with the Roberts
nomination in 2005 (Toobin 2008). Consequently, the only conservative interest group we
could study was the Reagan administration itself. Eventually, as data allows, we want to
look at nominations with more involvement from conservative groups.
Moving forward, the logical progression of this research is to compare the topics
covered in the briefing books with the topics covered in a senator’s questioning. Specter, for
example, mentioned that he spent two weeks doing his own research regarding Bork’s record
and firmly believed the interest groups did not influence his approach to the nomination
(Specter and Robbins 2002). Did his questions overlap with the information provided to
him by interest groups? And if they did, how much overlap was there? These are the next
questions to ask and they encompass a promising avenue of future research.

27

References
Benoit, Kenneth, Kohei Wantanabe, Paul Nulty, Adam Obeng, Haiyan Wang, Benjamin
Lauderdale and Will Lowe. 2017. “Quanteda: Qualitative Analysis of Textual Data.” R
Package .
URL: http://quanteda.io/
Berenson, Tessa. 2017. “How Neil Gorusch’s Confirmation Fight Changed Politics.” Time .
URL: http://time.com/4730746/neil-gorsuch-confirmed-supreme-court-year/
Binder, Sarah A. and Forrest Maltzman. 2009. Advice and Dissent: The Struggle to Shape
the Federal Judiciary. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Black, Ryan C., Anthony J. Madonna and Ryan J. Owens. 2014. “Qualifications or Philosophy? The Use of Blue Slips in a Polarized Era.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 44(2):290–
308.
Caldeira, Gregory A. and John R. Wright. 1998. “Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests,
Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate.” American Journal of Political
Science 42(2):499–523.
Caldeira, Gregory A., Marie Hojnacki and John R. Wright. 2000. “The Lobbying Activities
of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations.” Journal of Politics 62(1):51–69.
Cameron, Charles M., Cody Gray, Jonathan P. Kastellec and Jee-Kwang Park. 2018. “From
Textbook Pluralism to Modern Hyper-Pluralism: Interest Groups and Supreme Court
Nominations, 1930-2017.” Working Paper .
URL: https://bit.ly/2WYu5Te
Cameron, Charles M., Jonathan P. Kastellec and Jee-Kwang Park. 2013. “Voting for Justices:
Change and Continuity in Confirmation Voting 1937-2010.” Journal of Politics 75(2):283–
299.
28

Chiou, Fang-Yi and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2014. “Executive Appointments: Duration,
Ideology, and Hierarchy.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(3):496–517.
Cohen, Lauren M. 1998. “Missing in Action: Interest Groups and Federal Judicial Appointments.” Judicature 82(3):119–123.
Collins, Paul M. and Lori A. Ringhand. 2013. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and
Constitutional Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Collins, Paul M. and Lori A. Ringhand. 2016. “The Institutionalization of Supreme Court
Confirmation hearings.” Law and Social Inquiry 41(1):126–151.
Davis, Richard. 2017. Supreme Democracy: The End of Elitism in Supreme Court Nominations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epstein, Lee and Jeffrey A. Segal. 2005. Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments. New York: Oxford University Press.
Epstein, Lee, Rene Lindsadt, Jeffrey A. Segal and Chad Westerland. 2006. “The Changing
Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees.” Journal of Politics 68(2):296–
307.
Farganis, Dion and Justin Wedeking. 2011. “’No Hints, No Forecasts, No Previews’: An
Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Nominee Candor from Harlan to Kagan.” Law and
Society Review 45(3):525–559.
Farganis, Dion and Justin Wedeking. 2014. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings in the
U.S. Senate: Reconsidering the Charade. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Fenno, Richard. 1978. Homestyle: House Members in Their Districts. New York: Little
Brown.

29

Flegenheimer, Matt. 2017. “The Roots of the Battle Over Neil Gorsuch: They Started It.”
New York Times .
URL: https://nyti.ms/2nCLhfX
Gibson, James L. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 2009. “Confirmation Politics and the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Institutional Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the Alito
Nomination.” American Journal of Political Science 53(1):139–155.
Grimmer, Justin. 2013. Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why
It Matters. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Grimmer, Justin and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls
of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts.” Political Analysis 21(3):267–
297.
Hamilton, Alexander. 2003. Federalist No. 76. In The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter.
New York, NY: Penguin.
Howard, Nicholas O. and Jason M. Roberts. 2015. “The Politics of Obstruction: Republican
holds in the U.S. Senate.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(2):273–294.
Johnson, Timothy R. and Jason M. Roberts. 2004. “Presidential Capital and the Supreme
Court Confirmation Process.” Journal of Politics 66(3):663–683.
Kastellec, Jonathan, Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips. 2010. “Public Opinion and Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees.” Journal of Politics 71(3):767–784.
Kennedy, Edward M. 2009. True Compass: A Memoir. New York: Twelve.
Krehbiel, Keith. 2007. “Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game.” American Journal of Political Science 51(2):231–240.

30

Krutz, Glen S., Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond. 1998. “From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird:
Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate.” American Political Science Review 92(4):871–881.
Lee, Frances E. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S.
Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lockman, Brian and Francine Schertzer, eds. 2017. Arlen Specter: An Oral History. Camp
Hill, PA: Pennsylvania Cable Network.
Manning, Christopher D. and Hinrich Schutze. 1999. Foundations of Statistical Natural
Language Processing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press.
McMillion, Barry J. 2018. “Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the
Senate Judiciary Committee.” Congressional Research Service .
URL: https://bit.ly/2DasT7p
Moraski, Bryon J. and Charles R. Shipan. 1999. “The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices.” American Journal of Political
Science 43(4):1069–1095.
Nelson, Michael. 2018. “The Kavanaugh Hearings Could Shape the Supreme Court – Even
if he’s Not Confirmed.” Washington Post Monkey Cage .
URL: https://wapo.st/2tiGt2M
Nemacheck, Christine L. 2008. Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme
Court Justices from Herbert Hoover through George W. Bush. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

31

Nobel, Kenneth B. 1987. “New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate Dismissals.” New
York Times .
URL: https://nyti.ms/2SMujuh
Rice, Douglas. 2019. “Measuring the Issue Content of Supreme Court Opinions.” Journal of
Law and Courts .
Scherer, Nancy. 2005. Scoring Points: Politicians, Political Activists, and the Lower Federal
Court Appointment Process. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Schoenherr, Jessica A., Elizabeth A. Lane and Miles T. Armaly. 2018. “The Purpose of
Senatorial Grandstanding During Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings.” Working Paper
.
Schoenherr, Jessica A. and Ryan C. Black. 2019. “The Use of Precedent in U.S. Supreme
Court Litigant Briefs.” Elgar Research Handbook on Judicial Process In production.
Smith, Steven S. 2007. Party Influence in Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Solberg, Rorie Spill and Eric N. Waltenburg. 2015. The Media, the Court, and the Misrepresentation. New York: Routledge.
Specter, Arlen. 2018. “Arlen Specter Senatorial Papers, Group 2, Legislative Files, 19652011, TJU.2010.01.02.” Thomas Jefferson University (managed by the University of Pittsburgh Library System) .
Specter, Arlen and Charles Robbins. 2002. Passion for Truth: From Finding JFK’s Single
Bullet to Questioning Anita Hill to Impeaching Clinton. New York: William Morrow.
Steigerwalt, Amy. 2010. Battle over the Bench: Senators, Interest Groups, and Lower Court
Confirmations. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.

32

Taylor, David Van. 2009. “Advise and Dissent.” Sundance Institute and Film Festival .
Toobin, Jeffrey. 2008. The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court. Anchor
Books.
Totenberg, Nina. 2012. “Robert Bork’s Supreme Court Nomination ‘Changed Everything,
Maybe Forever’.” NPR .
URL: https://n.pr/2MXYzyN
Woodward, Bob and Scott Armstrong. 1979. The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court. New
York: Simon and Schuster.

33

